You Promised! - May an Employer Cancel or Modify Employee Severance Pay Arrangements? by Shawe, Earle K. & Swerdlin, Mark J.
Maryland Law Review
Volume 44 | Issue 3 Article 6
You Promised! - May an Employer Cancel or
Modify Employee Severance Pay Arrangements?
Earle K. Shawe
Mark J. Swerdlin
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Earle K. Shawe, & Mark J. Swerdlin, You Promised! - May an Employer Cancel or Modify Employee Severance Pay Arrangements?, 44 Md.
L. Rev. 903 (1985)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/6
YOU PROMISED!-MAY AN EMPLOYER CANCEL OR
MODIFY EMPLOYEE SEVERANCE PAY
ARRANGEMENTS?
EARLE K. SHAWE*
MARK J. SWERDLIN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Businesses are facing increasing pressures to close unproduc-
tive, outmoded plants and open new, competitive facilities. Plants
that have long been in service and therefore have large numbers of
employees with lengthy service records are the facilities most sus-
ceptible to the economic requirement of shutdown in favor of new
efficient facilities. One result of these closings has been active litiga-
tion on the issue of severance pay, and labor lawyers, as well as gen-
eral practitioners, are likely to face severance pay issues even more
frequently in the future. The basic issue confronting the practi-
tioner is whether or not employees have vested rights in severance
pay benefits.
This Article examines the primary theories used when employ-
ees have challenged attempts by employers to change or cancel sev-
erance benefits and discusses the courts' responses to those
theories. The severance pay problem is explored in the context of
both non-union employer/employee relationships and in em-
ployer/employee relationships that are governed by a collective bar-
gaining agreement. In the non-union setting, employee claims for
severance pay have been based on programs contained in company
personnel policy manuals. In union settings, such claims arise from
the severance pay provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.
Because the source of the claim is unique to each setting, the theo-
ries advanced by employees to support their claim that severance
benefits are vested rights may differ. There are, however, legal the-
ories that are used by both union and non-union employees arguing
for severance benefits.
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II. THE THEORIES
The setting and the sequence of events leading up to a com-
pany decision not to pay severance benefits will determine the legal
theories that can be advanced by workers seeking to recover those
benefits. In the case of a unionized employer, two different sce-
narios could result in employees, and/or their union, deciding to
take legal action to obtain severance benefits. In the first scenario,
the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement gives the em-
ployer the opportunity to enter into negotiations with the union on
the effect of a contemplated plant closing on severance pay benefits.
When the parties reach a bona fide impasse,' the employer will then
attempt to implement a final offer, reducing and/or eliminating the
severance benefits provided for in the expired labor contracts. In
the second, more drastic case, the employer could wait until the col-
lective bargaining agreement expires, close the plant without paying
benefits, and then claim that it was under no obligation to comply
with the terms of an expired contract.
A non-union employer, faced with a plant closing, may be even
more abrupt. Such an employer, under no obligation to bargain
with its workers about employment terms, may simply choose to
take a unilateral action to alter or eliminate a severance pay plan or
practice.
In response to these scenarios, workers and/or unions have
1. The requirement of bargaining to impasse arises from section 8(d) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), which imposes a duty to bargain collec-
tively as to "terms and conditions of employment." See generally 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1982). If the subject of bargaining is found to be a term or condition of employment,
then bargaining is mandatory, see NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356
U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958), but employers are not required to make concessions, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1982). Thus an employer may take a position on a mandatory subject and
bargain to impasse. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349. Pension and insurance benefits are
clearly recognized as mandatory subjects. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am.,
Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 159 (1971). See also
Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Chicago-St. Louis Transp.
Co., 535 F. Supp. 476, 479 (N.D. I11. 1982) (pension and other fringe benefits are
mandatory subjects), afd mem., 720 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1983); Home Box Office, Inc. v.
Directors Guild of Am., Inc., 531 F. Supp. 578, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (profit sharing plan
is mandatory subject), aff'dpercuriam, 708 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1983). See generally O'Keefe &
Tuohey, Economically Motivated Relocations of Work and an Employer's Duties Under Section 8(d)
of the National Labor Relations Act: A Three Step Analysis, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 795, 801
n.29 (1983) (detailing range of subjects that are mandatory). The Supreme Court has
recognized that the effects of plant closing decisions may be mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining, see First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1981), and at
least one circuit has recognized an employer duty to bargain over severance pay at the
time of a plant closing, see Electrical Prod. Div. of Midland-Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 617
F.2d 977, 983 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980).
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attempted to force employers to comply with the terms of severance
pay plans under three different theories. Union employees have
based their claims on all three theories; non-union employees have
based their claims on the second and third theories. The theories
are as follows: (1) a claim under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)2 that plant closing and/or layoff benefits may not be termi-
nated following negotiations over those benefits which end in im-
passe;3 (2) a claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA)4 that the benefits have vested or are otherwise pro-
tected by ERISA; and (3) a claim of breach of contract, based either
on section 301' of the Labor Management Relations Act6 or on
common law contract principles.
A. Termination of Benefits Upon Reaching Impasse Under the NLRA
The unionized employer that is considering closing its plant
might attempt, through collective bargaining at the expiration of the
labor agreement, to secure from the union concessions that modify
or eliminate severance pay benefits or other forms of plant closing
benefit programs. Securing concessions would be the optimum so-
lution for the company because the union would be bound by the
concessions that it made and would therefore be foreclosed from
2. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982)).
3. Impasse is defined as a deadlock, stalemate, or hiatus in negotiations. Bonanno
Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 412 (1982). An impasse is generally not
reached until the parties' positions have become fixed and neither indicates a willingness
to change its position. There is no clear test for determining when an impasse exists; it
depends on the "totality of circumstances." The NLRB considers " '[the bargaining
history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the length of the negotiations, the
importance of the issue or issues as to which there is a disagreement, [and] the contem-
poraneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations.' " Saunders
House v. NLRB, 719 F.2d 683, 687 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Taft Broadcasting, 163
N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967), enforced sub nom. AFTRA, Kansas City Local v. NLRB, 395 F.2d
622 (D.C. Cir. 1968)). See also Harding Glass Indus., 248 N.L.R.B. 902, 906 (1980) (ap-
plying the Taft Broadcasting test); Dust-Tex Serv., Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 398, 405 (1974)
("[G]enuine impasse in negotiations is one where despite parties' best efforts to achieve
an agreement neither party is willing to move from its respective position.").
For example, in Creasey Co., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1131, 1132 (1984), the NLRB
held that the parties had reached impasse on the issue of severance pay after five negoti-
ating sessions in a one-month period. The parties had resolved all their differences ex-
cept severance pay and were unable to settle that issue despite discussing it at each
session and the union having put forward three different proposals. Id.
4. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982)).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
6. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982)).
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seeking judicial enforcement of benefits that had been negotiated
away.
In the more likely event that the company is unable to secure
from the union an agreement on the proposed concessions eliminat-
ing or reducing plant closing benefits, the company may unilaterally
put into effect its last offer and alter those benefits, provided, how-
ever, that the parties have negotiated on the severance pay issue and
have reached a bona fide impasse.
The General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) recently issued an advisory memorandum in a case in which
an employer, while in the process of closing its plant at the expira-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement, attempted to renegoti-
ate severance benefits with a union.7 In WABCO, the parties
negotiated to impasse, whereupon the employer implemented its fi-
nal offer, which substantially reduced the severance benefits pro-
vided for in the expired contract. The General Counsel dismissed
the union's unfair labor practice charge against WABCO and thus
allowed the reduction in severance benefits to stand.8
The General Counsel noted that the mandatory terms and con-
ditions of a collective bargaining agreement are controlling between
the parties, even after the agreement expires. Those terms and con-
ditions remain in effect until a new agreement is negotiated or a
genuine impasse is reached.9 But, once the employer bargains to
genuine impasse, "the employer may unilaterally put into effect its
last offer to the union." ' Severance benefit provisions are not "ex-
empt from these general rules as being compensation for past
work."" By merely providing for severance benefits in the contract,
the employer does not agree to continue those benefits forever.
Rather, as long as the employer bargains to genuine impasse as to
the changes it proposed to make in the severance benefit plan, the
employer is no longer bound to continue the original benefit plan
unchanged. 12
While typically a unilateral change after impasse involves an in-
crease in wages or benefits (although less of an increase than the
union is demanding), WABCO illustrates that a bargained-for but not
agreed-upon reduction may also be implemented. Similarly, in an
7. WABCO, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1103 (1983).
8. Id. at 1104.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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analogous case, the NLRB recently held that an employer had not
committed an unfair labor practice by terminating its payments into
three union fringe benefit funds, the Supplemental Unemployment
Benefit Fund, the Prepaid Legal Service Fund, and the Education
Fund." In Western Newspaper Publishing Co.,' 4 the parties had
reached impasse on bargaining for a new contract in January of
1981. In March, the employer stopped contributing to the union's
fringe benefit funds. The union claimed that the employer violated
section 8(a)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act' 5 by unilat-
erally changing the terms of employer participation in the funds.
Finding that the employer's unilateral changes were consistent with
its pre-impasse proposals, the NLRB held that there was no viola-
tion of section 8(a)(5), stating: "It is well settled that, after bargain-
ing to an impasse, an employer does not violate Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act by making unilateral changes, as long as the changes are
reasonably encompassed by the employer's pre-impasse
proposals."' 6
Following the reasoning of these cases, it would appear that,
under the NLRA, a company can unilaterally implement its last of-
fer, including its final position with respect to severance benefits
contained in the expired contract, upon reaching a bona fide im-
passe in negotiations with the union.
B. Severance Benefits under ERISA' 7
While a company may, under the NLRA, prospectively alter
severance benefits, it might face a different type of attack if it seeks
to extinguish them retroactively for employees who arguably have
already qualified for them. If a company attempts to terminate plant
13. Western Newspaper Publishing Co., 269 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1173, 1175 (1984). See also O'Malley Lumber Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 1171, 1178-79 (1970)
(employer held not to have violated its bargaining obligation when, upon impasse, it
ceased contributions to the union's health and welfare plan in accordance with its bar-
gaining position during negotiations).
14. 269 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 116 L.R.R.M. 1173 (BNA) (1984).
15. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)
(1982).
16. 269 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1175.
17. Chapter 18 of the United States Code, titled the Employee Retirement Income
Security Program (ERISA), regulates employee benefit plans. The purpose of ERISA is
to protect participants in such plans by imposing reporting and disclosure requirements,
by establishing standards of conduct for the fiduciaries of such plans, by imposing
vesting and funding requirements, and by providing appropriate remedies for the
violation of these requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)-(c) (1982). Severance pay
plans may be subject to ERISA. See infra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
closing benefits, there are two arguments against such action that
have been raised under ERISA. Employees have argued first, that
the company curtailed benefits vested under the terms of a sever-
ance benefit plan by discontinuing the plan;' 8 or second, that the
company violated fiduciary duties owed to the participants in the
plan by discontinuing the plan.' °
Employees have claimed that their severance benefits under
ERISA are "vested" or "nonforfeitable." ° Under ERISA, however,
vesting requirements are inapplicable to non-pension benefits. The
legislative history of ERISA indicates that its vesting rules were in-
tended to cover only accrued benefits under retirement plans.2'
Other benefits, such as early retirement, severance, and insurance,
classified as ancillary, are not "accrued. '12
The Fourth Circuit recently considered the argument that ER-
ISA vesting rules applied to severance benefits. Relying on the leg-
islative history of ERISA, the court of appeals, in Sutton v. Weirton
Steel Division of National Steel Corp.23 held that ERISA vesting rules do
not apply to protect severance benefits. In Sutton, the original em-
ployer, National Steel Corporation, provided its employees with
early retirement benefits and severance pay, which were to be paid
18. Under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982), an employee may bring a civil action to recover
employee benefit plan benefits due him.
19. The fiduciary obligations are described in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103-1104 (1982). Sec-
tion 1104 of the Act imposes the following obligations on a plan fiduciary: "[A] fiduci-
ary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(l) (1982).
20. Vested rights are nonforfeitable rights. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4670, 4719. Section 1002 defines "non-
forfeitable" as: "a claim obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that part of an
immediate or deferred benefit under a pension plan which arises from the participant's
service, which is unconditional, and which is legally enforceable against the plan." 29
U.S.C. § 1002(19) (1982).
21. H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 4670, 4726 ("vested employee is protected in his rights to ... 'accrued
benefits' ").
22. See, e.g., Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 963, 966 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (early retirement benefits are not "accrued benefits" within the meaning of ER-
ISA); see also H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4670, 4726 ("The term 'accrued benefit' refers to pension or retirement
benefits and is not intended to apply to certain ancillary benefits, such as medical insur-
ance or life insurance, which are sometimes provided employees in conjunction with a
pension plan and are sometimes provided separately.")
23. 724 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2387 (1984).
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to qualified employees in the event of a shutdown or layoff. Na-
tional sold its Weirton Steel Division to a new company, Weirton
Steel Corporation. Although the employees of the Division became
immediately employed by Weirton Steel Corporation upon the sale,
the employees argued that their status as National employees was
terminated, triggering the payment of contingent benefits, which in-
cluded severance pay. 2" Noting that the severance pay plan was
both contingent and unfunded, the court stated that "[t]he Act was
not designed to prohibit modification of these ancillary benefits
... .An employer may change such benefits without violating ER-
ISA. ''25 Further, the court found that "[t]he accrued benefits se-
cured by ERISA do not encompass unfunded, contingent early
retirement benefits or severance payments. "26
It seems clear from Sutton and from the history of the statute
that ERISA vesting provisions will not protect employee severance
benefits from retroactive extinguishment. Another argument, how-
ever, may be made under ERISA, i.e., that severance pay plans are
employee "welfare benefit plans ' 27 and, as such, are subject to the
ERISA fiduciary provisions, which impose on employers a fiduciary
obligation to maintain benefits established by existing severance pay
plans.2 8 Several courts considering the status of severance benefit
plans have held that severance benefit plans are employee welfare
24. Id. at 409-10.
25. Id. at 410. There is little case law considering forfeiture or elimination of ancil-
lary benefits, but there is analogous case law that considers whether pension benefits
that are not required to be nonforfeitable may, under ERISA, be eliminated. Those
cases indicate that such non-vested benefits may be forfeited. See, e.g., Fentron Indus.,
Inc. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300, 1306 (9th Cir. 1982) ("pension
plan may cancel benefits not required by ERISA's minimum vesting provisions"); Hep-
ple v. Roberts & Dybdahl, 622 F.2d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 1980) (ERISA does not prohibit
forfeiture of benefits in excess of minimum vesting requirement); Fremont v. McGraw-
Edison Co., 606 F.2d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 1979) (ERISA does not prohibit forfeiture of
benefits in excess of minimum vesting requirement), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980).
26. 724 F.2d at 410. See also Gutting v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 541 F. Supp. 345,
347 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (ERISA vesting provisions are inapplicable to employee welfare
benefit plans).
27. Employee welfare benefit plan is defined at 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982). An em-
ployee welfare benefit plan "is a plan, fund, or program established by an employer to
provide common employee benefits other than retirement benefits." la PENS. & PROFIT
SHARING (P-H) 16,115 (1984). Welfare benefit plans are generally subject to ERISA
fiduciary responsibility rules. See 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (1982) (fiduciary responsibility
rules apply to all employee benefit plans, including welfare plans); Little & Thrailkill,
Fiduciaries Under ERISA: A Narrow Path to Tread, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977).
28. ERISA fiduciary provisions impose general standards of conduct: fiduciaries
shall discharge duties for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants, 29
U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1982); fiduciaries must act prudently, id. § 1104(a). These provisions
also detail a number of prohibited transactions. Id. § 1106. See generally Little &
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benefit plans. 29
If fiduciary obligations apply,30 an employer alteration of a sev-
erance pay plan which does not benefit employee participants may
be found to violate ERISA. For example, in Dependahl v. Fallstaff
Brewing Corp. ,"' the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld
the district court's holding that an employer violated its fiduciary
duties under ERISA by substantially increasing the eligibility re-
quirements of both its unfunded severance pay plan and its funded
insurance benefit program shortly before imposing mass
terminations. 2
In Dependahl, the employer had instituted an unfunded sever-
ance pay plan in 1973 with no minimum service requirement.3 In
1975 the company amended its plan to require fifteen years of ser-
vice before an employee would be eligible for severance benefits.
3 4
The district court held that an employee who had been with the
company for only ten years was entitled to severance pay because
the company had amended its plan two months before his termina-
tion, in anticipation of mass layoffs.3 5 The district court found that
this amendment, in these circumstances, was a violation of the ER-
ISA fiduciary provisions, 6 and the court of appeals affirmed. 7
Although this issue was not discussed by the court of appeals,
the district court in Dependahl noted that its decision did not mean
Thrailkill, supra note 27, at 11-15. Employers who exercise discretionary authority in
regard to severance benefit plans would be considered fiduciaries. See id.
29. See, e.g., Sutton v. Weirton Steel Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1184,
1202 (N.D. W. Va. 1983) (stating that severance pay, though not a retirement benefit,
does come within the reach of ERISA as an "employee welfare benefit plan"), afd, 724
F.2d 406, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2387 (1984); Petrella v. NL Indus., Inc., 529 F. Supp.
1357, 1361-62 (D.N.J. 1982) ("Congress intended the term 'Welfare Plan' to include a
plan for severance benefits"); Donnelly v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 696, 698
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (severance pay plan set forth in employer's personnel policy manual
held to be employee welfare benefit plan within coverage of ERISA).
30. The general argument is that, although the "vesting" or "accrued benefit" provi-
sions of ERISA do not apply to severance plans, Sutton, 724 F.2d at 410, other protective
provisions of ERISA do apply, such as safeguards against discrimination, found in 29
U.S.C. § 1140 (1982), and the imposition of fiduciary duties, outlined in id. § 1104. See
Sutton, 567 F. Supp. at 1202; infra text accompanying notes 31-40.
31. 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1981), modifying 491 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Mo. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 968.
32. Id. See also Calhoun v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Mo. 1979)
(employer's amendment of severance plan to exclude employees otherwise eligible
when it was contemplating large layoffs violated its fiduciary duties under ERISA).
33. 491 F. Supp. at 1190.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1196-97.
36. Id. at 1197.
37. 653 F.2d at 1213-14.
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that an employer could never cut back benefits previously provided
to employees. 8 Instead, it held only that such a reduction is imper-
missible under ERISA "when made expressly in contemplation of
actions which would otherwise entitle employees to the previously
provided benefits." 39
Under Dependahl, an employee might advance an argument that
ERISA imposes fiduciary obligations that restrict an employer's abil-
ity to modify previously established severance benefits. What
Dependahl does not clarify is when those fiduciary obligations will al-
low an employer to modify such benefits, or when the fiduciary obli-
gations do not apply to modifications. Such clarification is
complicated by the dual role an employer plays with respect to ben-
efit plans. As the Supreme Court has recognized, a company may
have two roles with respect to an employee benefit plan. As an em-
ployer, it is free to take positions in negotiations that are adverse to
the interests of plan participants. As a plan administrator, however,
a company must use plan assets in the best interest of plan
40participants.
In the context of an employee welfare plan, the question then
arises: When may a company act to further its own economic inter-
ests, unconstrained by ERISA, or, if ERISA fiduciary provisions ap-
ply, under what circumstances may plan benefits be restricted or
even eliminated? In Amax Coal, the Supreme Court noted that a
company must ignore its "employer" role when it deals with funded
employee benefit plans, 4' such as those that ERISA requires to be
kept in a separate trust.42 But the obligations of a company regard-
ing an unfunded welfare plan are arguably different from its obliga-
tions arising from funded pension plans. Thus, an employer may
argue that ERISA's fiduciary standards do not preclude alterations
38. 491 F. Supp. at 1197. And another district court has noted that, while the fiduci-
ary standards set forth within the Act require that the administration of a severance pay
plan may not violate a relationship of trust, the provisions do not prohibit amendment
or termination of the plan. See Dhayer v. Weirton Steel Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp., 571
F. Supp. 316 (N.D. W. Va.), aff'd sub nom. Sutton v. Weirton Steel Div. of Nat'l Steel
Corp., 724 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2387 (1984).
39. 491 F. Supp. at 1197.
40. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 333 (1981). Amax Coal concerned em-
ployee benefit funds governed by the Labor Management Relations Act, but the Court
recognized that ERISA incorporated the fiduciary standards of that act. Id. at 332-33.
41. Id. at 333-34. The Fourth Circuit in Sutton recognized the employer's two roles,
and, citing Amax Coal, noted that, for a pension plan, the employer was not permitted to
assume a position in which it had dual loyalties, and was bound by ERISA's fiduciary
obligations to ignore its role as employer. Sutton, 724 F.2d at 410.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l)(B) (1982).
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to an unfunded contingent benefit plan such as severance pay.43 As
the Fourth Circuit stated in Sutton: "Congress, however, has not
prohibited an employer who is also a fiduciary from exercising the
right accorded other employers to renegotiate or amend, as the case
may be, unfunded contingent benefits payable before normal retire-
ment age."
4 4
Despite the Fourth Circuit's statement that "changes [in sever-
ance pay plans] . . . are not to be reviewed under fiduciary stan-
dards, ' 45 it seems likely that there are circumstances in which
fiduciary standards may be invoked to prevent changes. For exam-
ple, if an employer terminates an unfunded severance pay plan at
the same time as he is taking actions, such as massive layoffs, that
would normally trigger severance pay liability, that termination may
be viewed as an act of bad faith.46 As such, the act would be treated
as a violation of a fiduciary duty.47
C. Vesting of Severance Benefits Under Common Law Contract Principles
The preceding discussion indicates that, under the NLRA, a un-
ionized employer could unilaterally eliminate plant closing sever-
ance benefits upon reaching bargaining impasse, and that ERISA
may not preclude reductions of severance benefits. Still to be con-
sidered, however, is the widely advanced argument that severance
pay entitlement is grounded in contract principles.48 Contract argu-
43. See, e.g., Sutton, 724 F.2d at 410. Cf. Dependhal, 653 F.2d at 1214 (unfunded excess
benefit plans are exempt from ERISA)(emphasis added).
44. 724 F.2d at 410-11.
45. Id. at 411. The district court in Sutton found that the severance pay plan, a wel-
fare benefit plan, came within the reach of ERISA fiduciary standards but found that
because such plans are not subject to vesting and nonforfeiture requirements, there was
no breach of duty when the employer sought to limit benefits. 567 F. Supp. at 1202-03.
The Fourth Circuit, in affirming, stressed that ERISA duties that relate to vested rights
could not be invoked to prevent modifications of non-vested benefits. Sutton, 724 F.2d
at 411. The Sutton decision apparently leaves open the question of whether there are
fiduciary standards, other than those related to vested rights, that could apply.
46. See, e.g. Dependahl, 491 F. Supp. at 1196-97; Calhoun v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,
478 F. Supp. 357, 360-61 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
47. The argument would be that the exclusive benefit requirements of 29 U.S.C.
§ 1103 (1982) impose a common law duty of loyalty upon the employer who administers
the severance pay plan, and that termination of an unfunded plan to avoid paying the
layoff benefits is a breach of that duty.
48. See, e.g., Straus-Duparquet, Inc. v. Local Union No. 3, 386 F.2d 649, 651 (2d Cir.
1967) ("[a]fter the period of eligibility is served, the full severance pay is due whenever
termination of employment occurs"); In re Public Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762, 772, 773
(3d Cir. 1947) (severance pay is a "claim within the terms of the hiring," and becomes a
"due debt"); Hercules Powder Co. v. Brookfield, 189 Va. 531, 543, 53 S.E.2d 804, 809
(1949) (recognizing the expressed contract right of an employer to discontinue a sever-
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ments have been made that rest either on collective bargaining
agreements or on the existence of less formal contractual
arrangements.
In a number of cases, employees have challenged termination
of employee benefit plans that are made after expiration of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. In the main, the issue in these cases is
whether, if the collective bargaining agreement expires or is termi-
nated, there still exists any obligation to pay severance benefits.
Cases dealing with cutbacks of analogous benefits provide a
framework within which severance pay cutbacks may be analyzed. In
one such case, International Union, U.A. W v. Roblin,49 the court faced
the question of whether a retiree insurance benefit plan, provided
for in the collective bargaining agreement, survived a plant closing.
The court concluded that the plan did not survive closing of the
business, as the agreement contained specific language limiting
those benefits to the term of the agreements,50 and the agreements
were terminated by the plant closings. Other courts have reached
similar conclusions. 5' In other cases, however, when the collective
ance payment plan, but holding him obligated for severance payments "already earned
as of the date of its discontinuance"); Montefalcone v. Banco Di Napoli Trust Co., 268
A.D. 636, 640, 52 N.Y.S.2d 655, 658 (1945) (severance pay constitutes "compensation
earned, the amount of which was measured by the extent of previous service"). Two
recent Ninth Circuit cases suggest, however, that common law breach of contract claims
for severance pay may be preempted by ERISA. See Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708
(9th Cir. 1985); Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1985).
49. 561 F. Supp. 288, 298 (W.D. Mich. 1983). The litigation surrounding Roblin
Industries' decision not to pay benefits to its former employees, who were terminated as
a result of the July 3, 1982, decision to cease operations at its Battle Creek facility, has
resulted in four separate decisions thus far, all of the same name. 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2411 (Dec. 9, 1982); 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2418 (Mar. 31, 1983); 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2428 (May 27, 1983); 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2598 (Aug. 19, 1983).
50. 561 F. Supp. at 301. The court stated:
Generally, a collective bargaining agreement does not create an employer-em-
ployee relationship and does not guarantee the continuance of any relation-
ship. Consequently, the rights conferred under a collective bargaining
agreement do not normally survive the discontinuance of a business or the ex-
piration of a bargaining agreement. However, rights conferred by collective
bargaining can extend beyond the term of an agreement, or beyond the termi-
nation of operations, if the parties to an agreement so provide. Thus, if any
benefits are to extend beyond the termination of plant operations, the agree-
ment must so provide. Accordingly, the validity of plaintiffs' vested rights the-
ory, in the present case, turns on an interpretation of the instant Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
Id. at 298 (citations omitted).
51. See, e.g., Metal Polishers Local No. 11 v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.
Ohio 1982) (insurance benefits limited to duration of agreement); United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. Lee Nat'l Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1181 (S.D.N.Y 1971) (in-
surance benefits limited to duration of agreement).
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bargaining agreement has not clearly specified that a particular ben-
efit plan terminated upon plant closing or expiration of the contract,
courts have imposed liability for the benefits.52
Reasoning from these cases, it seems likely that, for severance
pay, the language in the collective bargaining agreement governing
the plan will determine whether the severance pay benefits are lim-
ited to the term of the agreement. But cases arising today concern
severance plans adopted before the parties presumably knew of the
importance of such limiting terms. Courts have therefore had to
consider allegations that denial of severance pay was a breach of a
collective bargaining agreement, when the plan language neither
limits the payment of severance pay to the duration of the agree-
ment nor indicates that severance pay is a vested benefit.
One of the first courts to consider whether severance pay bene-
fits continue after the expiration of a contract was the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Owens v. Press Publishing Co..s In Owens, the col-
lective bargaining agreement established a right to severance pay
when employees left the company for any reason other than gross
misconduct. The plaintiffs were former employees who had left
their jobs, for reasons other than gross misconduct, in the months
of January, February, and May of 1953; the collective bargaining
agreement expired August 22, 1952. The plaintiffs sought sever-
ance pay in an amount calculated by using their entire length of ser-
vice, including those months after the contract had expired. 54
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Owens held that the claimants
were entitled to severance pay in amounts corresponding to their
length of service as of the date that the collective bargaining agree-
ment expired. The court rejected the company's argument that sev-
erance pay was not due unless the separations came during the life
of the agreement: "[T]he right to such pay can 'arise' only during
52. See, e.g., International Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983) (employer cannot
terminate retiree benefits upon plant closure because retiree benefits are "status" bene-
fits with an implication that they continue so long as the beneficiary remains a retiree),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1002 (1984); Upholsterers' Int'l Union v. American Pad & Textile
Co., 372 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1967) (insurance benefits intended for duration of retire-
ment absent limiting language); see also UAW v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., 113
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2525, 2530 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (rebuttable presumption that welfare
benefits for retirees are vested for life unless "clear evidence indicating a contrary inten-
tion" is shown); Wessel, Promises, Promises: Firms SeeA to Cut Insurance for Retirees, Wall St.
J., Apr. 17, 1985, at 35, col. 4 (discussing current attempts by companies to cut off retir-
ees' health insurance benefits).
53. 20 N.J. 537, 120 A.2d 442 (1956).
54. Id. at 543, 120 A.2d at 445.
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the subsistence of the contract so providing, and not after its termi-
nation; but once the right thus comes into being it will survive the termination
of the agreement."55
The court was unpersuaded by the former workers' claim that
they had earned severance benefits after August 22, 1952. In rea-
soning used by several state courts that have also held that sever-
ance pay is remuneration for past services,56 the court noted that
"the right to separation pay was a creature of the collective bargain-
ing agreement alone, a consensual undertaking limited to a fixed
term."' 57 The court found that traditional contract law principles
limited the severance pay benefits to the period of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, and, when the agreement expired, "its provi-
sions had no in futuro force and effect."5" Severance pay that
accrued during the contract period was a vested right, but that right
"came to an end" when the agreement expired.59 In holding that
the severance pay was a vested right, the Owens court stated that it
was actually remuneration for service rendered during the period
covered by the agreement. That the event necessary to trigger the
severance pay did not occur during the life of the agreement was,
according to the New Jersey Supreme Court, irrelevant.6"
The question of when severance pay rights are vested by con-
tract law has received limited consideration by the federal courts. In
United Steelworkers of America v. H.K Porter Co.,61 the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania implied that
severance pay was nonforfeitable. The court held that the company
was required to arbitrate a dispute concerning pension, severance
pay and vacation benefits after the collective bargaining agreement
expired, because the employees might have vested rights in such
benefits.62 The court noted, however, that whether the plaintiffs'
55. Id. at 548, 120 A.2d at 448 (emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., Dahi v. Brunswick Corp., 277 Md. 471, 480-81, 356 A.2d 221, 226-27
(1976); see also Chapin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 31 Cal. App. 3d 192,
198-99, 107 Cal. Rptr. 111, 115-16 (1973); Willets v. Emhart Mfg. Co., 152 Conn. 487,
490-91, 208 A.2d 546, 548 (1965); Gaydos v. White Motor Corp., 54 Mich. App. 143,
147-48, 220 N.W.2d 697, 700, leave to appeal denied, 392 Mich. 800 (1974); Hercules
Powder Co. v. Brookfield, 189 Va. 531, 540-41, 53 S.E.2d 804, 808 (1949).
57. 20 N.J. at 549-50, 120 A.2d at 448.
58. Id. at 550, 120 A.2d at 448.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 548, 120 A.2d at 448.
61. 64 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2201 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
62. Id. at 2202-03 (citation omitted). The court noted that:
The rights of the employees to such benefits as severance and vacation pay and
pension do not automatically terminate upon the expiration of the agreement
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claims had merit was a question to be decided by the arbitrator and
not the court.63
As H.K Porter illustrates, disputes over the severance pay provi-
sions of a collective bargaining agreement are likely to be reserved
to an arbitrator for decision. In the few reported cases, arbitrators
have held that severance pay benefits can survive the expiration of
the collective bargaining agreement, absent contractual provisions
limiting the benefits to the life of the contract. Fort Pitt Steel Castings
Division 4 provides an example. In that case, Fort Pitt and a United
Steelworkers local union had a collective bargaining agreement ef-
fective through March 3, 1978, which included severance pay for all
employees terminated as a result of a plant shutdown. The parties
were unable to come to a new agreement, and the union struck on
March 8, 1978. Several meetings were held through the fall of
1978, but the parties reached impasse on the issue of severance pay.
On November 29, 1978, the company announced plans to shut
down its plant and terminate all employees. When the company
took the position that no severance pay was owing because the con-
tract under which it arose had expired, the union filed a grievance
on the issue of severance pay.65 After the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court's order that
the arbitration provision survived the expiration of the agreement,66
an arbitrator heard the employees' grievance on severance pay.
establishing them. They are vested rights and their benefits may well come to
fruition at a time beyond the term of the agreement establishing them.
Id. (citation omitted).
63. Id. at 2203. The arbitrator in that case held that the severance pay was a vested
right, payable even though the collective bargaining agreement was no longer in effect.
H.K. Porter Co., 49 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 147, 151 (1967) (Cahn, Arb.). In H.K. Porter, the
arbitrator also held that the company acted improperly in refusing to allow its employ-
ees an option to go onto layoff (in order to accrue additional service for pension bene-
fits) rather than be terminated upon plant closing. Id. at 152-53. For a contrary view, in
a case where the authors' law firm represented the employer, see an unreported decision
by arbitrator Alfred C. Dybeck in Connors Steel Co. (Nov. 27, 1984). In contrast to H.K.
Porter, one district court held that a severance benefit was not a vested right but more like
an insurance policy, with the right to collect contingent upon the happening of an event
during the contract period. See Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union
AFL-CIO v. Nolde Bros., 382 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (E.D. Va. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
530 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1975), afd, 430 U.S. 243 (1977). In reversing the district court,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the question of whether severance
benefits had vested was a question for arbitration and not for the court. 530 F.2d at 550-
51.
64. 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 909 (1981) (Sembower, Arb.).
65. Id.
66. United Steelworkers v. Fort Pitt Steel Castings, 635 F.2d 1071 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985 (1981).
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The arbitrator held that the severance provisions survived the
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. In reaching his
holding, the arbitrator noted that it would be unrealistic to require
the parties to provide expressly in the agreement that severance
benefits are to continue beyond the expiration of the contract and
the existence of the plant-for the parties know that the very nature
of a severance plan is "to provide for a remote contingency, and its
purpose fails if the expiration date of the contract is to fall like a
guillotine and cut off coverage at the very moment when it is needed
and makes sense.
' 6 7
Similarly, in Brooklyn Eagle,68 an arbitrator awarded severance
pay to employees who were terminated three and one-half months
after the expiration of their collective bargaining agreement, which
had included severance provisions. The arbitrator stated that -It]he
fact that the event of dismissal which made the payments due came
after the termination date [of the contract] does not affect the
matter."
69
What these few reported cases indicate is that there is a strong
likelihood that arbitrators, confronted with a claim for severance
benefits, may find such benefits to be a vested right, even if the ter-
minations occurred after the collective bargaining agreements that
authorized the benefits had expired. In such a situation, severance
benefits may, however, be limited to benefits accrued during the life
of the agreement. While an argument may be made that no benefits
should be paid after an agreement expires in the absence of lan-
guage indicating that the right extends beyond the term of the con-
tract, such an argument is not likely to succeed. Courts and
arbitrators will not use the expiration of the agreement to limit ben-
efits that accrued before that expiration. Given the possibility that
ambiguous language about the duration of rights will be interpreted
in favor of those to whom the rights were initially granted, parties
desiring to limit severance benefits must use explicit language.
D. Breach of Contract Claim in the Absence of a
Collective Bargaining Agreement
In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, state
courts have applied traditional contract principles to limit an em-
ployer's right to modify or eliminate its employees' severance bene-
67. 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 909, 911 (1981) (Sembower, Arb.).
68. 32 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 156 (1959) (Wirtz, Arb.).
69. Id. at 160.
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fits unilaterally. 70  In Kulins v. Malco, a Microdot Co.,7' an Illinois
appellate court went one step further, examining the modification of
severance benefits provided in a personnel policy for employees-at-
will as though those benefits were contained in a collective bargain-
ing agreement. 72 The court held that, while an employer can unilat-
70. Several jurisdictions observe the rule that, by providing a severance pay plan for
its employees-at-will, an employer extends a unilateral contract offer, which its employ-
ees can accept through continued service with their employer. DeGiuseppe, The Effect of
the Employment-At-Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1, 57 (1981) (citing Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98,
99-100, 291 P.2d 91, 92 (1955); Mace v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 155 Conn. 680,
684-85, 237 A.2d 360, 361-62 (1967); Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277 Md. 471, 476, 356
A.2d 221, 224 (1976); Gaydos v. White Motor Corp., 54 Mich. App. 143, 147-48, 220
N.W.2d 697, 700, leave to appeal denied, 392 Mich. 800 (1974); Anthony v. Jersey Cent.
Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. Super. 139, 144-46, 143 A.2d 762, 764-66 (1958)); accord
Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 472 N.E. 2d 765, 775 (1984); Dulaney
Foods, Inc. v. Ayers, 220 Va. 502, 512, 260 S.E.2d 196, 202 (1979). Under this view, the
employer cannot refuse to pay severance benefits once the employees have accepted its
offer, see DeGiuseppe, supra, at 57; however, if the plan is modified and the employees
continue in their employer's service, the terms of the new plan are binding on the em-
ployees, see Kulins v. Malco, a Microdot Co., 121 Ill. App. 3d 520, 527, 459 N.E.2d 1038,
1044-45 (1984); Dulaney Foods, Inc. v. Ayers, 220 Va. at 511, 260 S.E.2d at 201.
See also, Livernois v. Warner-Lambert Co., 723 F.2d 1148 (4th Cir. 1983) for a
discussion of whether the purchaser or seller is liable for severance benefits after the
transfer of a business. Warner-Lambert had maintained a severance policy at its Medical
Surgical Division facility, located in Greenwood, S.C., since 1957. OnJanuary 20, 1982,
Warner-Lambert sold that facility to Professional Medical Products, Inc. (PMP). PMP
continued to operate the facility with essentially the same work force. Moreover, the
former Warner-Lambert employees continued to work for PMP under the same condi-
tions and for the same wages.
Eleven employees brought an action against Warner-Lambert for severance ben-
efits. They claimed that even though they were still employed, they were entitled to
severance pay because one of the conditions for severance pay coming due had been
met, i.e., their jobs with Warner-Lambert had been eliminated.
The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina agreed with the plain-
tiffs that because their employment with Warner-Lambert had ended they were owed
severance pay. The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed, stating that since the plaintiffs
were still working at PMP under the same conditions as they had been working for
Warner-Lambert, there had been no job termination. The Court then addressed an is-
sue that had not been raised by either side-which party would be liable for severance
benefits that came due in the future. The court stated that even though Warner-Lam-
bert had transferred to PMP the responsibility to make severance payments that came
due in the future, Warner-Lambert remains primarily bound for severance pay which
accrued while it was the employer, i.e., 1957-January, 20, 1982, in the event its agent,
PMP, fails to make the payments. PMP would be solely liable for any severance benefits
which accrued after it purchased the facility.
71. 121 Ill. App. 3d 520, 459 N.E.2d 1038 (1984).
72. The Illinois Appellate Court was not the first to analyze the benefits contained in
a personnel policy in this manner. See, e.g., Chapin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument
Corp., 31 Cal. App. 3d 192, 197, 107 Cal. Rptr. 111, 114 (1973) ("[T]ermination pay
provisions are identically construed whether contained in formal written agreements,
such as collective bargaining agreements, or a corporate personnel policy that becomes
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erally modify its severance pay plan for its employees-at-will
prospectively, those benefits earned prior to the modification can-
not be eliminated.73
The Kulins court's novel approach deserves close consideration.
The factual background in the Kulins case was as follows: In 1967,
Malco Manufacturing Company instituted a severance pay policy,
which gave eligible employees one week's pay for each year of ser-
vice with the company. In 1971, Microdot purchased Malco. The
new company modified the old severance pay policy twice, in 1972
and in 1975. The latter modification changed the policy drastically,
placing a five-week ceiling on the amount of severance pay available
to an eligible worker. Within two weeks of the last revision, Malco
began laying off large numbers of employees, paying them sever-
ance pay pursuant to the new plan. 74 Workers employed by Malco
Manufacturing during the term of the 1967 plan sued for severance
benefits that they claimed had vested and accrued during the life of
that plan. The court agreed with the employees that those benefits
had vested and, therefore, could not be eliminated retroactively.75
In reaching this decision, the court rejected the company's ar-
gument that the court could not read a vesting requirement into
Malco's severance policy because such a decision would intrude into
an area preempted by ERISA and, in fact, conflict with the ERISA
provision that excludes severance plans from the statute's vesting
requirements. 76 Unpersuaded by this argument, the court noted
that its decision was grounded on established principles of contract
law that do not conflict with ERISA.77 Further, citing no authority,
the court rejected the company's argument that the vesting provi-
part of the understood employment agreement .... ")(citations omitted), quoted in De
Giuseppe, supra note 70, at 51 n.278.
73. 121 Il1. App. 3d at 527, 459 N.E.2d at 1044-45.
74. Id. at 521-22, 459 N.E.2d at 1041.
75. Id. at 527, 459 N.E.2d at 1044. Noting that no Illinois appellate court had ever
decided whether severance pay benefits accrue or vest during the term of employment
of an at-will employee, the court decided that it could consider cases involving organ-
ized employees:
[A]lthough the terms of a collective bargaining agreement are not at issue in
the present case, because termination pay provisions are to be identically construed
whether contained in a formal written agreement or in a corporate personnel policy that
becomes part of the understood employment agreement, we are not precluded from con-
sidering cases which construe collective bargaining agreements.
Id. at 524-25, 459 N.E.2d at 1043 (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying
notes 71-72.
76. Id. at 525, 459 N.E.2d at 1043.
77. Id. The court's discussion of ERISA is dicta since Malco failed to raise the ER-
ISA argument at trial, which caused the issue to be waived on appeal. See id. at 525 n.2,
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sions of ERISA preclude the vesting of severance pay plans, finding
that those provisions "merely provided that vesting was not re-
quired."7 8 In holding that the benefits outlined in the 1967 plan
had vested, the court characterized severance pay as deferred com-
pensation, earned each week that the employee works, and payable
on discharge:79
It is a benefit for which employees work as much as they
work for any other benefit held out to them as compensa-
tion by the employer, and one which accrues during each work
year that the agreement is in effect, not merely on the date that it
becomes payable. When services are rendered, the right to secure the
promised compensation is vested as much as the right to receive wages
or any other form of compensation. . . , and the lack of a promise
to vest does not revoke the employer's obligation to pay.80
The Kulins court found further support for its decision in the
doctrine of promissory estoppel. Thus, the court held that the com-
pany was estopped from retroactively eliminating severance bene-
fits.8" The company's promise to pay severance benefits induced
the employees to stay with Malco and to forego their right to seek
employment elsewhere. Malco benefitted since it was able to avoid
"unrest on the part of its employees" and, most importantly, retain
the services of its employees "during a time of financial difficulty."82
The court emphasized that to allow the company to retract its prom-
ise to pay severance benefits, after years of reliance by its employ-
ees, "would run counter to the fundamental principles of equity and
justice, and raise a serious question as to Malco's compliance with
the implied covenant of good faith essential to every contract. "83
The Kulins decision is indicative of the reasoning that many
courts have adopted in concluding that severance benefits are
earned compensation and cannot be eliminated retroactively.8 4 By
holding that the benefits under the 1967 plan had vested and ac-
crued, giving the company no room for adjusting those benefits, the
Kulins court went further than any court to date. In the future,
459 N.E.2d at 1043 n.2. The court addressed the compatibility of its decision with ER-
ISA "in the interests of comprehensive discussion." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 525-26, 459 N.E.2d at 1043-44 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 527, 459 N.E.2d at 1045. See generaly DeGuiseppe, supra note 70 (discuss-
ing use of promissory estoppel in severance benefit claims).
82. Id. at 527-28, 459 N.E.2d at 1045.
83. Id. at 528, 459 N.E.2d at 1045.
84. See, e.g., supra note 70.
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should other courts follow the Illinois court's lead-which seems
likely since many jurisdictions view severance benefits as earned
compensation"-'-companies that hire employees-at-will and have a
severance pay plan will not be able to avoid that plan by later modi-
fying it; and those who were employed during the term of the plan
will enjoy its benefits, even though they did not make their claims
under the plan until after its term expired. To avoid this result, the
company can include disclaimer provisions in its severance pay pol-
icy. 86 So long as the disclaimer unambiguously states that the policy
is subject to unilateral changes by the employer, the employees
"have no legitimate expectation that any particular policy will con-
tinue to remain in force."
8 7
III. RELATIONSHIP OF AN EARLY RETIREMENT PROGRAM TO
SEVERANCE BENEFITS
One other route has been taken by employers who are con-
fronted with severance pay obligations when a plant closing is con-
templated. Employers have attempted to encourage employees
eligible for normal or early retirement to retire and thereby exclude
them from plant closing benefits. Employees have challenged this
practice on the grounds that it violates the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA).88
As two recent cases indicate, employers will find it difficult to
defend this practice against such a charge. In EEOC v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.,89 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
brought an ADEA claim against Westinghouse based on the com-
pany's exclusion from its Layoff Income and Benefits (LIB) Plan of
those employees who were eligible for early retirement. The exclu-
sion was challenged on the ground that it subjected older employ-
ees to different treatment than that afforded younger employees
because older employees were denied LIB benefits on the basis of
85. See supra note 48.
86. See Kulins, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 526-27, 459 N.E.2d at 1044; Helle, 15 Ohio App. 3d
at 10, 472 N.E.2d at 774; DeGiuseppe, supra note 70, at 53-54 (providing examples of
appropriate disclaimers). To the extent that oral assurances conflict with written dis-
claimers, the disclaimers are negated. Helle, 15 Ohio App. 3d at 10, 472 N.E.2d at 775;
DeGiuseppe, supra note 70, at 54.
87. Helle, 15 Ohio App. 3d at 10, 472 N.E.2d at 774 (quoting Toussaint v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 619, 292 N.W.2d 880, 894-95 (1980)).
88. The ADEA forbids an employer to "discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982).
89. 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 92 (1984).
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age.90 The company argued that its policy was permissible under
the section of the Act that allows an employer to differentiate among
employees if such differentiation is based on a reasonable factor
other than age,9 since the employees involved were denied LIB
benefits because of their eligibility for early retirement and not be-
cause of their age. The Third Circuit rejected that argument be-
cause eligibility for early retirement was too closely related to age to
be given credence as a valid justification.92
Westinghouse also argued that the LIB, which granted benefits
to qualified employees who were not eligible for early retirement,
was a bona fide employee benefit plan under the section of the Act
that allows such benefit plans, even if they distinguish among indi-
viduals on the basis of age, if a plan is not "a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of the act."93 The court held that the LIB was not a bona
fide benefit plan. Noting that employee plans under which Con-
gress permits age discrimination to occur (e.g., retirement, pension,
and insurance) are the types of plans in which the cost of benefits
increases with age (i.e., the cost is greater for newly hired older
workers than for other employees), the court stated that severance
pay costs no more for a newly hired older worker than for his
younger counterpart.94 Therefore, this exception to the Act was not
applicable either. Thus, because older employees were treated dif-
ferently than younger ones, and because the LIB did not fall under
the statutory exceptions allowing such differential treatment, the
court held that the company violated the ADEA by excluding early
retirees from its layoff benefit plan.95
The Ninth Circuit, in EEOC v. Borden 's, Inc. ,96 also dealt with an
ADEA claim based on an early retirement program. In 1979, Bor-
den's shut down its Phoenix, Arizona dairy operation and termi-
nated all its dairy employees. Borden's provided severance pay
90. Id. at 221-22.
91. Id. at 222. Section 623(f)(1) of the Act permits an employer to differentiate
among employees on the basis of age if "age is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or where such
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(0)(1)
(1982).
92. 725 F.2d at 222-23.
93. Id. at 223. Section 623(f)(2) of the Act allows an employer "to observe the terms
of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retire-
ment, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes" of
the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982).
94. 725 F.2d at 224.
95. Id. at 224-25.
96. 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984).
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upon closing of its plant pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
ment with the union, but excluded all employees eligible for normal
or early retirement. 97 That severance pay plan was challenged on
the grounds that it specifically treated older employees differently
from younger ones and that it had a differential impact on older
employees.98 The district court denied the disparate treatment
claim, but found that the ADEA had been violated by the disparate
impact of the denial of severance benefits on older employees .99 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit not only upheld the finding of disparate
impact, but also found disparate treatment of older employees.' 00
The court based its finding of a violation of the ADEA on the
fact that severance benefits were denied to those employees who
were eligible for early retirement, and that this denial had a discrim-
inatory impact on older employees because all of those who were
over 55 were denied severance benefits under this plan.' 0 ' Beyond
this disparate impact, the court also found that there had been dis-
parate treatment of older employees since each of the older employ-
ees was " 'forced to give up a newly created benefit given to other
employees (severance pay) in exchange for benefits [he] . . . already
had (retirement).' "102 The court rejected Borden's arguments that
the practice was allowable under exceptions that permit different
treatment of older employees. The court found first that because
Borden's did not contend that its policy was economically necessary,
the defense of business necessity' was inapplicable; and, second,
the court found that the fact that those denied severance pay were
also eligible for pension and insurance benefits did not amount to
the statutory defense that allows disparate treatment based on a rea-
97. Id. at 1391-92.
98. EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 1095, 1097-98 (D. Ariz. 1982), af'd, 724
F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984).
99. Id. at 1097-99.
100. 724 F.2d at 1393.
101. Id. at 1392.
102. Id. at 1393-94 (quoting the district court, 551 F. Supp. at 1098).
103. An employer charged with violating the ADEA may argue that the practice is a
business necessity and thus allowable under the "reasonable factor other than age" ex-
ception to the Act. See generally Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565 (1979). The justification is most often
advanced in the context of a challenge to forced layoffs or early retirements. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir, 1984) ("Forced early retire-
ments based on economic necessity are unacceptable under the ADEA unless they meet
two tests . . . the necessity for drastic cost reduction obviously must be real . . . [and]
the forced early retirement must be the least-detrimental-alternative means available to
reduce costs."). In Borden's, the district court found, and the court of appeals agreed,
that Borden's showed no evidence of business necessity. 724 F.2d at 1394.
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sonable factor other than age.' °4 Finally, as in Westinghouse, the
bona fide benefit plan exception to the Act was held inapplicable
because the severance plan did not serve the purposes for which
that exception was developed.' 0 5
As Westinghouse and Borden's indicate, it is likely that any type of
mandatory early retirement program implemented with a view to-
wards excluding older employees from severance or layoff benefits
would violate the ADEA. Courts may, however, take a different view
where the number of employees eligible for such benefits is de-
creased due to inducements provided in a voluntary early retirement
program. 106
IV. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing analysis indicates, employers that seek to limit
or deny severance benefits will face challenges from employees
based on a variety of legal theories. While severance pay plans can
be altered to cut off benefits prospectively, case law reveals the pro-
pensity of courts and arbitrators to find that severance benefits are
vested or accrued rights and therefore cannot be canceled retroac-
tively. That propensity is intensified when the modification or elimi-
nation of severance pay benefits occurs close to the time of plant
closure or substantial reductions in force. Courts may take a less
hostile view of changes to severance pay plans made well in advance
of plant shutdown and significant permanent layoffs. Finally, at-
tempts to limit severance benefits to those not eligible for early or
104. 724 F.2d at 1393-94. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1982) provides that: "It shall not be
unlawful for an employer .. .to take any action otherwise prohibited . ..where the
differentiation is based on reasonablePfactors other than age .... "
105. 724 F.2d at 1395-96. The court found the severance pay policy to be a "simple
fringe benefit" outside the scope of 29 U.S.C. § 623(f(2) (1982). Id. at 1396-97 (citing
Alford v. City of Lubbock, 664 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975
(1982)). Noting that the purpose of the bona fide benefit plan exception was to avoid
having ADEA disrupt pensions and other complex benefit schemes, the court agreed
with the reasoning of Westinghouse that this exception was aimed at plans in which the
costs of the plan increased with age. Id. at 1396.
106. See, e.g., Patterson v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 742 F.2d 465, 467 & n.3,
468 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding voluntary early retirement program as bona fide em-
ployee benefit plan under ADEA and finding the Borden's decision questionable because
severance pay was "a solatium for the plant closing," separate from early or normal re-
tirement and granted only to employees ineligible for retirement benefits); see also Ma-
son v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1978) (voluntary early retirement plan did
not violate ADEA); Britt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 84-2237, slip op. at 3, 6
n.3 (4th Cir. July 25, 1985) (upholding a general severance pay program conditioned
upon acceptance of a deferral of pension benefits, without expressing an opinion re-
garding the validity of the reasoning in Westinghouse and Borden 's).
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normal retirement are likely to violate the federal age discrimination
statute.
Because there are no federal funding requirements for sever-
ance pay plans, as there are for pension plans, and because employ-
ers have not considered their commitment to severance plans to be
enforceable financial liabilities, employers have tended to fund
these plans haphazardly, if at all. The imposition by courts and arbi-
trators of substantial severance pay liability has caught some em-
ployers by surprise. Now that the trend towards enforceability is
becoming clearer, employers can no longer treat lightly the an-
nouncement or creation of a severance pay program. Benefits
under a severance pay plan cannot be eliminated as easily or as pain-
lessly as they were granted.
